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I. Introduction
As the U.S. economic crisis was just getting off the ground, many analysts 
claimed Asia would be relatively immune to the impact because its economies 
had “decoupled” from the United States. The exports of countries like Japan 
and Korea were no longer as oriented to the United States as in the past. Instead, 
China was the major growth market.
In reality, the decoupling story is woefully wrong, for Korea as well as Japan. 
In both countries, this decade’s economic expansions have been extremely 
unbalanced; they combine a huge shortfall in consumer income and spending 
with a stunning rise in the trade surplus to make up for the shortfall in consumer 
demand. The notion this doesn’t matter because China is the market doesn’t 
hold water. That’s because many of the exports from Korea and Japan to China 
serve as inputs to China’s own exports to the United States. As U.S. imports 
from China slow, so will China’s imports from Korea and Japan.
What strikes us is the degree to which the growth strategy for the big three of 
Northeast Asia—Japan, China, and Korea—have all converged on the same 
fl awed pattern in this decade: falling consumer income and spending as a share 
of GDP and an explosive rise in the trade surplus. It’s a very risky strategy that 
could be sustained only as long as the United States kept expanding its trade 
defi cit. But now the price-adjusted U.S. trade defi cit is plunging and imports 
are declining.
All of this makes Korea, as well as Japan, very vulnerable to the U.S. slowdown. 
Indeed, while the offi cial forecasts from the Korean government still project 
growth of 4.8–5.2 percent in 2009, private forecasters think this is whistling 
past the graveyard. The Korea Economic Research Institute believes growth will 
slow to 3.8 percent next year, following projected 4.2 percent growth for 2008. 
Citigroup sees a slowdown to 3.4 percent in 2009. This is a far cry from the 4.8 
percent that Korea has averaged since 2002, and even these numbers may prove 
to be too optimistic depending on the severity of the U.S. recession.
II. First, the Good News
Korea’s Fundamentals Are Sound
To lift a phrase from Senator John McCain, the fundamentals of the Korean 
economy are sound. But they were also sound back in 1997–98 when investor 
panic and perverse International Monetary Fund policies all over Asia—for 
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example, forcing countries to raise interest rates and cut budget defi cits in the 
midst of a recession—sent the Korean economy into a 7 percent plunge in 1998. 
The good news is that, after that panic was cured and the IMF reversed itself, 
Korea bounced back to 9.5 percent growth in 1999 and 8.5 percent in 2000. The 
solid fundamentals that enabled such a powerful recovery seem to be still in place.
Japan had set the pattern for rapid catch-up, that is, for a very poor country to rise 
rapidly toward U.S. levels of per capita GDP. No other country had previously 
risen so far so fast. But Korea, like Taiwan, is on the verge of overtaking Japan’s 
record (Figure 1). As of 2006, Korea’s per capita GDP was nearly 10 times as 
high as it was 40 years earlier in 1968. In 2006, Korea was just as rich as Japan 
had been in 1988. What a change people have seen in their lifetimes. Assuming 
that Korea does not suffer a Japan-like “lost decade,” it is on the verge of 
overtaking Japan’s trajectory. So far, only Taiwan has done better.
Figure 1: Growth of GDP per Capita in Selected Asian Countries
Most economists think that Korea still has the potential to grow at 4.5–5.0 percent 
a year for several years to come, assuming no macroeconomic crisis (Figure 2). 
That would be an extraordinary rate of growth for a country as rich as Korea. 
Typically, poor countries grow slowly; then growing picks up as countries 
industrialize; and then growth slows again as countries mature.
Japan was also growing at 4–5 percent during the late 1980s, when its per capita 
GDP was the same as Korea’s today. The reason for greater optimism about Korea 
is that Korea’s growth is driven by solid increases in productivity (Figure 3)—a 
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strength that Japan had begun to lose even before its bubble turned into its lost 
decade. Labor productivity, growing at an average of 3.2 percent a year during 
this decade, has provided Korea with 70 percent of all GDP growth. The other 30 
percent is provided by more people working. By contrast, Japan’s labor productivity 
growth has averaged 2.2 percent during the current recovery, and sustainable 
productivity growth is probably somewhere between 1.5 percent and 2.0 percent.
Figure 2: Growth Rate of Korea’s Economy, 1987–2007
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Figure 3: Productivity in Korea’s Economy, 1987–2007
Even more important for high growth over the long haul is total factor 
productivity, that is, growth in GDP plus growth in labor and capital combined. 
In Korea, this has grown at 2 percent a year and has provided 40 percent of all 
GDP growth during this decade.
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There is another good sign for Korea in comparison with Japan. In the 1980s, 
Japan made up for its shortfalls in both productivity and consumer demand by 
using the monetary steroids of low interest rates to promote capital investment. 
That led to many white-elephant projects like offi ce buildings and factories that 
eventually turned into money losers that produce a mountain of nonperforming 
debt. Korea went through a similar problem prior to the 1997–98 crisis. Its 
capital formation rate (the sum of business, government, and housing investment) 
reached nearly 40 percent—an unsustainable rate. But now Korea has been able 
to maintain good growth rates even as it lowered its capital formation rate to a 
more sustainable high 20s (Figure 4).
Figure 4: Capital Formation Rate in Korea’s Economy, 1985–2007
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During a trip to Seoul in 1999, we heard an economic minister in the reform 
government of Kim Dae-jung declare, “You can’t have competitiveness without 
competition.” And so the Kim administration moved to open Korea more than 
ever before to trade and inward foreign direct investment (FDI) in the belief that 
increased competition with foreign countries would make Korea’s own fi rms “lean 
and mean.” This reasoning is solidly based. Evidence shows that, all other things 
being equal, countries with higher ratios of trade to GDP tend to grow faster.
The Kim Dae Jung administration also believed that economic liberalization 
would weaken the dominance of the economy by government-allied corporate 
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Korea had always been more open to trade than Japan, and this difference has 
increased of late.
The trade-GDP ratio (exports plus imports as a percentage of nominal GDP) 
has risen from 63 percent in 1985 to 90 percent in 2007 (Figure 5). In price-
adjusted terms—which better refl ect the competitive pressures on domestic 
Korean fi rms—the trade-GDP ratio has soared even more: from 34 percent in 
1985, to 71 percent when Kim Dae-jung came in, to 112 percent today (Figure 
6). The cumulative stock of FDI increased from 2 percent in 1990 to 8 percent 
by 2006 (Figure 7).
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Figure 5: Nominal Trade-GDP Ratio in Korea, 1985–2007
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Figure 6: Real Trade-GDP Ratio in Korea, 1985–2007
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By contrast, Japan’s nominal trade-GDP ratio is still only 27 percent of GDP, up 
from 13 percent in 1980. Its stock of inward FDI was only 2.5 percent in 2006, 
an improvement from the negligible level of 0.3 percent in 1990, but still way 
behind global trends.
The fact that Korea is opening up so much unilaterally explains one reason 
why there is so little strong business lobbying by U.S. fi rms on behalf of the 
U.S.-Korea Free Trade Agreement (KORUS FTA). Automakers are strongly 
against it, for fear of lowering the 25 percent import tariff on trucks. By contrast, 
most of the U.S. business sectors seeking greater opportunities for trade and 
investment in Korea are already seeing tremendous progress even without a 
KORUS FTA. Certainly, U.S. fi rms would benefi t, some (like fi nancial fi rms) 
more than others. But with so many other issues on which to spend their political 
capital, the KORUS FTA is a lower priority. Similarly, Barack Obama is hardly 
as hawkish on trade as he had to pretend to be in order to win the Democratic 
primaries. With so many other issues on his plate, it’s hard to see why he would 
spend political capital trying to push even a renegotiated KORUS FTA through 
Congress early in his term. Perhaps the best that can be hoped for is that a vote is 
delayed until the receptiveness improves. Trying to push an early vote probably 
poses a greater risk of defeat.
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Figure 7: Inward Foreign Direct Investment in Selected Asian Countries, 1990,   
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III. Economic Anorexia in Korea
Now for the bad news. Although Korea differs from Japan in many ways, it 
unfortunately resembles Japan (and China) in some of its macroeconomic 
imbalances.
Like Japan, Korea suffers from “economic anorexia,” a serious consumption 
disorder. Consumer spending is too weak to drive growth. That’s okay when a 
country is in the newly industrializing stage of development, and it suppresses 
consumption to free resources to promote high investment rates. But after 
a country becomes rich, it must shift to consumer-led growth. As a country 
matures, because of the law of diminishing returns, there are fewer opportunities 
for high-return investments. That is why, in mature countries, growth slows and 
investment rates decline. As investment rates decline, consumption rates need 
to rise to make up the difference. Unfortunately, Korea, like Japan before it, has 
moved in the opposite direction.
Consumer spending as a share of real (price-adjusted) GDP has taken a plunge 
even steeper than in Japan: from 65 percent of real GDP in 1985 to only 49 
percent in 2007 (Figure 8). This is not because Koreans are too frugal to spend, 
but because they lack suffi cient money to spend. The problem is not lack of will 
but lack of wallet. Household disposable income has fallen from 75 percent of 
real GDP in 1985 to only 53 percent in 2007 (Figure 9).
40%
42%
44%
46%
48%
50%
52%
54%
56%
58%
60%
62%
64%
1985 1987 1989 1991 1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005 2007
C
on
su
m
pt
io
n 
%
 o
f r
ea
l G
D
P
Figure 8: Consumer Spending as Share of Price-Adjusted GDP in Korea, 1985–2007
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Let us be clear. We are not talking about a decline in living standards. On the 
contrary, the rise in income and consumption and living standards has been 
phenomenal. Real personal consumption in 2007 in Korea was more than 
triple the level in 1985. What we are talking about is the fact that, as fast as 
consumption has risen, it has not risen as fast as GDP. While GDP has risen 
4.8 percent per year since 2002, consumption has risen only 3.1 percent. 
Consequently, consumption has declined as a share of GDP. That has produced 
a big macroeconomic imbalance.
Exports Make Up Demand Shortfall
For a country to grow, demand must equal potential supply. Korea’s good 
fundamentals (for example, its productivity) give it the potential to continue 
growing at healthy rates. Whether it can actually do so depends on whether 
demand is high enough to purchase all that Korea is able to produce. If 
consumption is falling as a share of GDP, then something else must rise to make 
up the difference. Otherwise, Korea would fall into a chronic malaise, as Japan 
did during its lost decade.
Like Japan and China, Korea has used a rising trade surplus to make up the shortfall. 
For an economy to have both exports and imports rise as a share of GDP in tandem 
is a very healthy development. That provides competitive pressures that force 
companies to improve their effi ciency, and it allows exporters to gain economies 
of scale. But for a large economy to rely inordinately on a rising trade surplus—
exports minus imports—is inherently unhealthy because it is not sustainable.
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Prior to the 1997–98 fi nancial crisis, Korea chronically ran a trade defi cit. It 
was consuming and investing more than it was producing. In essence, it was 
borrowing from the rest of the world in order to fi nance high capital formation 
rates at home. That can be a very sound economic strategy, just as it is sound for 
a company to borrow in order to fi nance growth. However, its huge buildup of 
short-term debt made Korea was very vulnerable when capital fl ight took place 
during the investor panic of 1997–98.
Since then, Korea, like other countries in Asia, has sought to avoid any future 
vulnerability on this count by running increasingly large trade surpluses in 
price-adjusted terms (for example, the number of cars exported vs. number of 
barrels of oil imported). By 2007, the trade surplus had soared to a stunning 11 
percent of GDP (Figure 10).
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Figure 10: Trade Surplus in Korea, 1985–2007
In nominal terms, Korea runs a negligible surplus, and sometimes a defi cit, 
because of higher prices on oil imports and other items. When it comes to 
promoting real demand for output, it is the price-adjusted trade surplus that 
matters. But the distinction between the real and nominal trade balances poses 
another kind of risk that we’ll discuss later.
As a result, Korea’s growth has become extremely unbalanced (Figure 11 and 
Figure 12). Even though consumption amounts to half of GDP, it has provided 
only 28 percent of growth in GDP during 2002–07. Business investment accounts 
for 29 percent of GDP but supplied only 23 percent of growth during this period. 
By contrast, the trade surplus provided a whopping 40 percent of growth, even 
though it averaged “only” 8 percent of GDP during this period. In fact, Figure 
11 looks very similar to charts we have run on Japan. 
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Unsustainable
Korea has, in effect, traded one kind of vulnerability for another. During the days 
when it ran big nominal trade defi cits, Korea was vulnerable to capital fl ight. As 
the money fl ed, Korea could no longer afford to import vital parts, materials, and 
oil. Factories shut down and the country suffered depression. But relying on an 
excessively large surplus to drive growth also leaves a country vulnerable. What 
happens if growth slows in the market countries and Korea’s exports decelerate 
or decline? That is the situation Korea faces today.
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Figure 11: Growth of Selected Sectors of Korea’s Economy, 2002–07
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In late 2008, the U.S. slowdown is only beginning to hit Korean exports. As of 
July 2008 (latest data available at the time of this talk), Korea’s price-adjusted 
exports were up 11 percent from year-earlier fi gures (Figure 13). That’s a 
comedown from 15 percent year-on-year growth earlier in 2008 but not much 
below the 12 percent average for the past few years.
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Figure 13: Price-Adjusted Exports in Korea, 2005–08
The Myth of Decoupling Owing to the China Market
Koreans, like the Japanese, have long believed that they had decoupled their 
economies from the United States. After all, they had diverted their export 
markets from the United States to China. From 30 percent in 1990, the share of 
Korean exports going to the United States fell to 12 percent by 2007. Conversely, 
the share going to China rose from zero in 1990 to 22 percent by 2007. The share 
going to Japan fell from 20 percent to a surprisingly small 7 percent (Figure 
14). Moreover, during the current decade, China has accounted for one-third of 
all Korea’s export growth, compared with only 4 percent for the United States 
and 3 percent for Japan (Figure 15).
Beyond that, Korea runs a big trade surplus with China, compared with a smaller 
surplus for the United States and a big defi cit with Japan (Figure 16). (Note that 
the surplus by country is measured in nominal terms because we do not have 
the data in price-adjusted terms.)
So, the Korean government and many analysts reckoned that, even if the United 
States slowed down, Korean exports could keep growing rapidly as long as 
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China held up. That’s exactly the same reasoning that prevailed in Tokyo until 
recently.
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Figure 14: Korea’s Exports to China, Japan, and the United States, 1990–2006
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Figure 15: Korea’s Export Growth vis-à-vis China, Japan, and the United States, 2000–07
But here’s the reality: as with Japan, Korea’s exports to China hinge on China’s 
own exports to the United States—not on China’s internal GDP growth. During 
the current decade, there has been a very high 72 percent correlation between 
the ups and downs of Korean exports to China and China’s own exports to the 
United States, up from a 50 percent correlation for 1994–2008. In other words, 
the correlation has gotten tighter over time (Figure 17)
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Figure 16: Korea’s Trade Balances with China, Japan, and the United States, 1990–2006
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Figure 17: Korea’s Exports to China Compared with China’s Exports    
 to the United States, 1994–2008
By contrast, to our great surprise, there has been virtually no correlation between 
the growth rates of Korea’s exports to China and Chinese GDP growth (Figure 
18). This is quite extraordinary. It suggests that most Korean exports to China 
serve as capital or material input for the Chinese companies that export to the 
United States. Korean exports to China are, in effect, Korean exports to the United 
States, with China as the midway station. Hence, even if, as many economists 
expect, China uses fi scal stimulus and other measures to sustain its own domestic 
growth during the U.S. recession, that will not keep Chinese demand for Korean 
goods at a high level. To put it another way, even if China has managed to 
decouple its own growth from the United States, that does not keep Korea safe.
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IV. Trading Partners
The United States Is Still the Locomotive
For good or ill, the United States remains the locomotive for much of Asia’s 
growth, certainly for Korea and Japan. In fact, the United States is such a global 
locomotive that, during the current decade, Korea’s global exports have mirrored 
the ups and downs of U.S. global imports. The correlation between Korean global 
exports and U.S. global imports has been a very high: 72 percent (Figure 19). 
This is extraordinary considering the big decline in the United States as a direct 
market for Korean exports.
18: Much Looser Link Between ROK 
Exports to China and China’s GDP
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19: Korea’s Global Exports Mirror
US Global Imports
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During 1992-2008, there was a high 72% correlation between Korea’s global 
exports and America’s global imports (both nominal). Even if fewer Korean 
exports go directly to the US, the US remains the ultimate locomotive.
Figure 19: Korea’s Global Exports Compared with U.S. Global Imports, 1992–2008
(left scale)
(right scale)
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This suggests two things. On the microeconomic level, it suggests that, not just 
in the case of China but elsewhere as well, Korean products are part of a global 
production and distribution network for which the United States is the ultimate 
customer. On the macroeconomic level, it suggests that the explosive growth 
in U.S. imports during much of this decade has been a great source of global 
demand stimulus.
But the consequence is this: if the United States slows its imports—globally 
or from only China—then sooner or later Korea’s global exports, including its 
exports to China, will have to slow. That is already happening. Indeed, because 
of the emerging U.S. recession, U.S. global imports are not just decelerating; 
they’re actually declining. As of mid-2008, the price-adjusted global imports to 
the United States were down 2 percent from year-earlier levels (Figure 20).
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Figure 20: Real Import Growth of the United States, 2000–08 
What about the Trade Surplus?
As noted earlier, the key factor for growth was not just exports, but net exports, 
that is, the trade surplus (in GDP accounting, exports add to demand while 
imports subtract from it). In 2007, Korea’s price-adjusted trade surplus was 11 
percent of GDP. For the trade surplus to continue driving growth, its ratio to 
GDP would have to rise even higher. Remember, it is not the size of the trade 
surplus that counts for GDP growth. What counts is whether that surplus is 
growing or shrinking. A trade surplus that goes from 11 percent to 9 percent of 
GDP detracts from growth.
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Korea simply cannot sustain a trade surplus at 11 percent of GDP indefi nitely, let 
alone cause it to keep rising. Korea is just too big to run the kind of surpluses a 
small economy might. Korea cannot run a trade surplus of $100 billion or $200 
billion or $300 billion unless the rest of the world combined runs an equal trade 
defi cit. For most of this decade, “rest of the world” mostly meant the United 
States as its trade defi cit exploded to a peak of 6 percent of real GDP in late 
2004. But now the combination of a cheaper dollar and economic weakness 
has reversed the huge growth in the trade defi cit. As of mid-2008, the real trade 
defi cit of the United States is down 40 percent, to $380 billion, from its peak of 
nearly $640 billion in late 2005 (Figure 21).
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Figure 21: U.S. Trade Defi cit, 1995–2008
The Won and Nominal Balances
One reason for Korea’s better-than-expected performance is a dramatic 20 
percent drop in the Korean currency, the won, since the beginning of the year 
(Figure 22). This has made Korean products cheaper on world markets. But 
in a world that is slowing down, currency deprecation is not a lasting recipe 
for export growth. It took a while for the impact to hit Japan. It is taking even 
longer for it to hit Korea.
There is another consideration for Korea: the gap between its trade balance in 
price-adjusted vs. nominal terms. In price-adjusted terms—the consideration 
that matters for driving demand—the Korean surplus, as we stressed above, 
hit 11 percent of GDP in 2007. However, in nominal terms, the surplus was far 
lower, less than 1 percent of GDP (Figure 23). One reason for this difference 
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is high prices for oil and other raw materials imports. If the price of oil goes 
from $20 a barrel to $100, then Korea’s import bill soars even if Korea does not 
import a single additional barrel of oil. A depreciating won also makes import 
prices higher.
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Figure 22: Exchange Rate for Korean Won, 2000–08
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Figure 23: Nominal Trade Balance as Percentage of GDP in Korea, 1980–2007
So, as Korean exports shrink in the global downturn, Korea is likely to start 
running a sizable nominal trade defi cit. In fact, some forecasters say that in 2008 
Korea may run the biggest nominal defi cit since 1996, when the defi cit was 
$20 billion. That could put additional downward pressure on the won. Korea 
has very large foreign exchange reserves and so should not suffer a crisis as in 
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1997–98, but it is something for policymakers to consider. A big loss in terms 
of trade (having to pay more for imports and earn less on exports) would be 
a considerable hit to the economy, Korea’s attractiveness to foreign investors, 
and fi nancial stability.
Comparisons with China
Korea’s excessive reliance on a rising trade surplus during this decade is hardly 
unique. The same pattern—and resulting vulnerability—affl icts both China and 
Japan. And both are already feeling the impact of the U.S.-originated global 
slowdown. It is striking to see how similar the pattern is in all three of the 
Northeast Asian countries.
Typically, poor countries devote about 60 percent of GDP to personal 
consumption. In China, consumption was already a relatively low 50 percent of 
GDP in the 1980s. Today, it’s a mere 37 percent, one of the lowest consumption 
rates in the world. Lowering the consumption share has allowed China to devote 
more resources to investment and thereby grow faster. So, in absolute terms, 
consumption has gone up tremendously. Back in 1990, 875 million Chinese lived 
on less than $2 a day; but by 2015, only 181 million will live in such abysmal 
poverty. A development strategy that brought enormous success has been taken 
to an unhealthy and unsustainable extreme.
The primary reason for low personal consumption is low income. According to 
prominent Sinologist Nicholas Lardy, household disposable income as a share 
of GDP fell by 5 percentage points and suffered another fall of more than 4 
points in 2004.
To make up for such anemic consumption, China has poured on investment. Total 
investment in public works, business investment, and housing now amounts to a 
gargantuan 45 percent of GDP, one of the highest capital formation rates in the 
world. One factor in propelling investment has been ultra-low interest rates that, 
at times, have become negative in infl ation-adjusted terms. Monetary steroids 
were a feature of Japan’s bubble as well. A second factor is an undervalued 
renminbi, which has stimulated a huge amount of investment in capital-intensive, 
export-oriented manufacturing sectors.
When money is so cheap, it is likely to be wasted. Calculations by the 
International Monetary Fund show that China gets less and less of an increase 
in GDP for each additional dollar of capital (factories, stores, offi ces, and roads). 
Declining productivity of capital also means that a growing number of projects 
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are losing money. That’s what leads to masses of nonperforming loans. China 
already suffered one such crisis in the 1990s and could suffer another. A capital 
formation rate of 45 percent of GDP is not sustainable. Without enough consumer 
income, however, simply reducing investment could hurt growth. It’s a dilemma 
that keeps policymakers up at night.
With personal consumption and investment combined not enough to absorb all 
that China can produce, China has turned to relying on a rising trade surplus. 
China lends foreigners money to buy Chinese products, giving China a trade 
surplus of 9 percent of real (price-adjusted) GDP. This is very unusual for China. 
In the 1980s, China ran negligible trade surpluses or even defi cits. During the 
1990s and early 2000s, its trade surplus averaged a mere 2–3 percent of GDP. 
Suddenly, after 2004, its trade surplus exploded, going from 2.5 percent of 
GDP in 2004 to approximately 9 percent in 2007. As a result, in 2005–07, the 
rising surplus provided 20–25 percent of all GDP growth, a new development 
for China. As with Korea, a trade surplus that high is simply not sustainable; 
China is too big for the rest of the world to keep absorbing such a huge surplus, 
particularly now that the U.S. defi cit is shrinking.
China’s leaders, including Premier Wen Jiabao, have recognized that this pattern 
of growth is not sustainable—and they have said so publicly. But they also admit 
that they are not quite sure how to achieve the changes that they seek.
Parallels with Japan
In its post-2002 recovery, Japan has followed the same pattern as Korea and 
China. Personal consumption is low and has fallen as a percentage of GDP in 
recent years. It was never the driver of growth but has become even less so in the 
recent recovery. Personal consumption amounts to 55 percent of GDP. Yet, in the 
post-2002 recovery, it accounted for only 32 percent of overall GDP growth.
The reason is not, as Japanese offi cials claim, because consumers are too anxious 
to spend or already have everything they want. Rather, they lack the money. 
Real worker compensation has fallen from 54 percent of GDP in the 1980s to 
only 50 percent in recent quarters.
With personal consumption so anemic, Japan has turned to business investment 
and a rising trade surplus as the main drivers of growth. Even though the trade 
surplus accounts for only 5 percent of GDP, it provided 31 percent of growth from 
early 2002 through early 2007. Business investment accounts for 16 percent of 
real GDP. Yet, from 2002 through the fi rst quarter of 2007, investment provided 
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another 33 percent of GDP growth. In other words, elements amounting to only 
one-fi fth of GDP provided two-thirds of growth.
This has already proved to be unsustainable. Business investment—much of 
which is related to exports—turned fl at in early 2007 and is now a drag on 
growth. Exports are still growth, but the pace of growth has already started to 
slow owing to the U.S. and global slowdown. In the three months ending in 
September 2008, the growth of real exports slowed to a negligible 0.8 percent 
from year-earlier levels. This compares with 10 percent growth at the beginning 
of 2008. The trade surplus fell in April–June.
As with Korea, many analysts said that Japan had decoupled from the United 
States because it was shifting its export market from the United States to China 
and offshore Asia. In reality, Japan’s exports to Asia hinged on Asia’s own exports 
to the United States. Consequently, in the three months ending in September, 
Japan’s real exports to China slowed to only 3 percent year-on-year growth from 
double-digit levels during most of the past half decade. Exports to Asia’s newly 
industrializing countries have stopped growing.
Consequently, Japan is now in recession.
V. Conclusion
Korea, along with Japan and China, adopted a highly risky growth strategy during 
the current decade—one that made sense only as long as the United States was 
able to keep expanding its trade defi cit. It seemed to work very well for a while, 
but it left Korea and its neighbors very vulnerable to a U.S. slowdown. It’s time 
for a big course correction in Northeast Asian growth strategies.
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